Oliver Eaton Williamson’s transaction cost economics
A theory at the intersection of economics, organizational theory, and contractual laws
This essay was translated from the 100-page literature review in my master’s thesis (in French), which the petty bureaucrats from the marketing department at the University of Quebec in Montreal (UQÀM) refused.
”Training in one or more contiguous social sciences is instructive for all students of economic organization. The pragmatic reason for such training is this: economists who lack an appreciation that some of what is going on out there has non-economic origins will be neglectful of or misinterpret forces that are responsible for consequential regularities that ought to be taken into account. ”– Oliver Williamson (2007, sect. 3)
The theoretical foundation
Transaction cost economics (TSE) is a theory at the intersection between economics, organization theory, and legal (contractual) literature created by Oliver E. Williamson, recipient of the Nobel of Economics in 2009 (Williamson, 1981, p. 550‑552; Williamson, 2007, sect. 2‑3; Rindfleisch, 2020).
The model rests on two fundamental hypotheses about human nature (Williamson, 1981, sect. II).
First, in opposition to the traditional neoclassical postulate, human beings are no longer considered to be fully rational agents (the economic man), but rather economic agents operate within the limit of their bounded rationality (the organizational man) (idem).
This postulate does not imply that economics agents don’t act rationally but are limited in their capacity to do so; they are thus considered “intentionally rational” (Williamson, 1981, sect. II).
Nevertheless, this conceptualization of the human psyche is limited to its cognitive component in opposition, for example, to that of Bernd Schmitt (1999, p. 53) for whom “experiential marketers view consumers as rational and emotional human beings who are concerned with achieving pleasurable experiences.” [1]
The second postulate regarding the organizational man is naturally opportunistic (Williamson, 1981, sect. II). Consequently, because some economic actors are dishonest (e.g. break their promises, cheat, lie) contractual relationships are uncertain and complex. Therefore, economic actors must incorporate ex-ante contractual clauses to prevent the other party from defecting on his or her engagements, with the direct consequence of creating friction (inefficiency when transacting).
We can suppose that Niccolo Machiavelli (2016) and Thomas Hobbes (Dockès, 2006) would approve of such an ontological postulate. [2] As a matter of fact, Machiavellianism, defined as a psychological trait (Paulhus and Williams, 2002), is someone who seeks to capitalize on people’s goodwill and trustfulness (naïveté from their perspective), as postulated by Williamson (2000, p. 600‑601).
Overall, the organization man is close to the economic agent from the REMM model (the Resourceful, evaluative, maximizing model) which postulates that economic agents are resourceful, deliberate, and creative in the pursuit of the satisfaction of their needs (postulated to be infinite), albeit the REMM do not assume anything about the agent’s intentions per se (Jensen and Meckling, 1994).
Based on his postulates, Oliver Williamson (1981, p. 554) thus proposes that “while organizational man is computationally less competent than the economic man, he is motivationally more complex.”
Interestingly, this cynical hypothesis regarding human nature is not part of Donald Coase’s hypothesis. That is, the Nobel of Economics at the origin of the theory of transaction costs remains agnostic regarding the agents’ motivations (Rindfleisch, 2020).
Moreover, Yokai Benkler, in his post-industrial conceptualization of the theory is more nuanced when he argues that humans have complex motivations: they can indeed behave selfishly, but they can also be motivated by social motivations (non-economics motivations) to contribute to collective projects, notably open-source projects such as Wikipedia and Linux (Rindfleisch, 2020). [3]
A market-based or a hierarchical relation?
The genesis of the theory
Oliver Williamson developed his theory following a one-year mandate at the anti-trust department of the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) (Rindfleisch, 2020).
During the 1960s and the 1970s, the legislative authorities in the U.S. thought that any attempt at vertical integration was intrinsically anti-competitive. Realizing that there was a dearth of theoretical fundament to support this postulate, Williamson sought to determine under which conditions it is preferable to rely on the market mechanisms relative to the conditions favoring the internalization of a given set of operations (Ketokivi and Mahoney, 2017, p. 4‑6).
All about transactions
As suggested in the name of the theory, the unit of analysis is the individual transaction (Williamson, 1991, p. 79-80) in opposition, for example, a succession of transactions as is the case in supply chain management (Williamson, 2008).
Those transactions are conceptualized based on three criteria: 1) their frequency, 2) their level of uncertainty, and 3) their specificity (Ketokivi and Mahoney, 2017, p. 6‑7).
While all three criteria are important when evaluating which mode of transaction is preferable, the specificity of the transaction is paramount. Such specificity can be related to the characteristic of a given location, the physical attribute of a component, or related to human traits (Williamson, 1981, p. 7‑8).
The model postulate (Williamson, 1981, p. 558‑560; 1991. p. 82-84; 2000, fig. 2; 2008, p. 8‑9) that the choice of a given mode of transaction rests essentially on the level of specificity relative to the contractual protection mechanisms selected by the partners to a transaction.
If the resource (financial, human, technology, etc.) to acquire is generic and, thus, fungible, the firm should prioritize the selection of a regular transaction on the economic market (A).
If a resource is specific, the firm must decide whether to rely on contractual mechanisms (clauses) to protect its particular interests or if it prefers to protect the resource via its own administrative mechanisms (that is, internalize the resource).
This decision depends on the level of specificity of the resource: a moderately specific resource (e.g. a computer chip that can be used in a wide variety of electronic devices) can be protected with long-term contracts (C) whereas a resource that is idiosyncratic to the firm – that is, a core product (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) – ought to be internalized (D).
However, the trade-off is that each additional layer of protection increases administrative costs (idem). In other words, market mechanisms have high transaction costs due to market imperfections (or frictions) and administrative mechanisms have high complexity costs due to the inefficiency inherent to managing a wide range of activities (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2004, chapter 9).
Oliver Williamson (1991, p. 83) thinks that firms should rely on market mechanisms as much as possible: “Vertical integration is the organization form not of first but of last resort – to be adopted when all else fails. Try markets, try long-term contracts, and other hybrid modes, and revert to hierarchy only for compelling reasons.” (Williamson, 1991, p. 83)
In any case, Williamson argues that firms ought to avoid scenario B according to which a resource is both specific and unprotected from market imperfections. Except under rare circumstances, this economist is convinced that hybrid contracting such as licenses and franchising (C) is preferable to an absence of contractual protection (B).
Transaction cost economics and HR management
Regarding HR management, Oliver Williamson (1981, sect. IV) recommends to evaluate employment contracting based on two criteria:
1. Are the competencies required to accomplish the role specific to the firm? For example, does a programmer have to learn an in-house programming language, or is the firm relying on open-source technologies (e.g. PHP, MySQL) and APIs (e.g. Bootstrap, jQuery)?
2. Is it easy to evaluate the performance of a given employee or group of employees? For example, it is much easier to evaluate factory workers' productivity than to evaluate a code snippet's value. [4]
At one end of the continuum, the position is considered to be fungible (non-specific and easy to evaluate). Accordingly, employees do not require additional protection. On the other end, the position is idiosyncratic to the firm (high specificity and hard to evaluate) and, consequently, the firm might provide additional insurance (incentives) to ensure the loyalty of key employees (Williamson, 1981, sect. IV).
It is noteworthy that this recommendation was formulated during the financialization of the economy, which occurred during the early 1980s in North America when corporations were transitioning from the “model of mutual reciprocity” [My translation] toward the “model of the three markets” [My translation] (financial market, employment/talent market, and competitive market) (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2004, Chapter 1).
Transaction cost economics and negotiation
According to Oliver Williamson (2008, p. 10‑11), there are three approaches that firms can use when managing their hybrid contracts with their partners.
First, the enterprise opting for the muscular approach adopts an instrumental attitude through which it seeks to maximize its profitability at the expense of the supplier or the business partner (idem).
Naturally, the canonical sources on the topic of negotiation argue against adopting a winner-loser stance, favoring instead the establishment of winning-winning relationships profitable for all the partners involved (Ury, 1992; Fisher et al., 2011).
On the one hand, modern microeconomics rejects the hypothesis of perfect rationality and recognizes that economic actors are willing to personally incur a loss if there’s a perception of injustice (Acemoglu et al., 2016, p. 451‑457).
For example, during the ultimatum game, “in general, studies reveal, offerors propose around 40% of the amount [of money] they were given; around 16% of people will reject such an offer and are more inclined to refuse small amounts than big amounts.” [My translation] (Acemoglu et al., 2016, p. 456)
On the other hand, from a strategic standpoint, when actors abuse their buyer power, eventually, the weaker suppliers tend to disappear or be purchased by stronger suppliers. Once the market has been consolidated around a strong group of powerful suppliers, the balance of power is reversed and the buyer becomes vulnerable to its suppliers’ power (Johnson et al., 2008, p. 75).
Second, the benign approach is about candidly seeking cooperation without planning for contingencies or doing its due diligence (Williamson, 2008, p. 10). [5]
A sagacious negotiator must always prepare him or herself beforehand but also, and most importantly, know his or her “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA), that is, his or her plan B if a good-willed negotiation fails (Ury, 1992, p. 18‑21).
Finally, Oliver Williamson (2008, p. 10-11) preconizes the credible approach, meaning, the introduction of contractual clauses ex-ante to ensure a credible engagement from all parties involved.
Transaction cost and marketing
The transaction cost theory has been validated with more than 900 empirical studies. Among them, about 10% were related to marketing including research related to relation management, strategic marketing, and brand management (Rindfleisch, 2020).
A canonical paper in international marketing is that of Anderson et Gatignon (1986) regarding the selection of market entry modes in foreign markets. According to them (p. 7), the level of control sought by firms depends on four factors:
According to them, it is preferable to opt for high levels of control when the firm seeks to protect its intellectual property, when the product is innovative or the product requires high levels of personalization, if the country risk is high, and when the brand has high value (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986, p. 10‑21).
That being said, the “default hypothesis” they preconize is that of transaction cost economics (TSE), that is: “low-resource commitment is preferable until proven otherwise.” (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986, p. 22) Notably, they argue this hypothesis has the benefit of being empirically testable.
It is noteworthy to point out that transaction costs economics (TSE) is at the antipode of the eclectic paradigm encouraging multinational firms to internalize their source of foreign competitive advantage (Dunning, 1980; 1988).
That being said, in the same line of hybrid contracting (Williamson, 1991), Mark III of the eclectic paradigm relaxes the ideal of internalization (I) with the incorporation of the notion of alliance capitalism (Dunning, 1995).
New technologies and new forms of economy
Transaction cost economics (TSE) was originally developed during the industrial age in the U.S.A. and technology was not an important factor at the time. Yet, technology plays a central role in the new iteration of TSE proposed by Yokai Benkler (Rindfleisch, 2020).
Notably, this new version of the theory claims that the rise of the Internet allowed the emergence of new forms of economies such as a sharing economy and collaborative consumption (Belk, 2014).
Those include, non-exhaustively, content communities (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010), idea generation platforms (Luo and Toubia, 2015), and crowdsourcing (Perret, 2019) all favoring social production (Rindfleisch, 2020).
Sharing economics also includes innovative business models such as that of BlablaCar (Barbe and Hussler, 2019), Uber (Moriuchi, 2023), and ZipCar (Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012).
Often, business models based on platform economy, for example, that of Airbnb, find their strength in network effects (Vieira et al., 2021), that is, the more users interact on a platform the more attractive the platform becomes, and, in turn, the more users it attracts.
It is proposed that the digital revolution allowed the emergence of decentralized governance models which are predicted to impact not only manufacturers but also all the actors along the supply chain (Rindfleisch, 2020). [6]
Yet, we should not romanticize those enterprises that build their business and brand around the sharing economy. [7]
Indeed, some authors suggest (Egresi et al., 2019; Phua, 2019; Hall et al., 2022) that Airbnb strayed away from its original ethos and, consequently, can no longer be considered a sharing platform. Notably, those authors report that Airbnb is increasingly competing against traditional accommodation (e.g. hotels). Furthermore, the hosting on the platform is increasingly managed by professional hosts (five rental units or more) rather than genuine homeowners with underuse rooms willing to offer their guests an authentic local experience.
Moreover, the platform owners put in place a complex governance system (Leoni et Parker, 2019), based notably on the principle of mutual surveillance (Gössling et al., 2021), to restrict and control users’ behavior (at their expense and naturally favoring the platform owners).
It could be interesting to use the lens of new institutional economics (Williamson, 2000) in future case studies on sharing platforms such as Airbnb.
Conclusion
There are three reasons why the work of Oliver Eaton Williamson is an inspiration for me.
First, in comparison to traditional “realist” authors such as Thucydides (Stefanovski and Čavoški, 2023; Murray, 2018), Machiavelli (2016), or Hobbes (Dockès, 2006) who used an anthropological axiom at the center of their theory (wars are inevitable because of human nature), most modern theories of strategies are structuralist (e.g. Micheal Porter’s (1991, 2008) competitive theory).
I agree with Oliver Williamson’s (1981, p. 553-554) behavioral assumptions. That is, in the context of strategy, it is useful for the strategist to lean slightly toward a cynical ontology and a skeptical approach to epistemology. [8]
Second, I most appreciate the fact that Williamson (2007, sect. 1.1.) insists on the “three imperatives” of the Carnegie Institute of Technology: 1) be disciplined, 2) be interdisciplinary, and 3) have an active mind.
I think those three imperatives are a useful guide for ambitious researchers aiming at developing a radical innovation in their research field (e.g. a new theory of strategy) in opposition to an incremental innovation (e.g. a whole career based on replication studies) (Voss, 2003). [9]
Footnotes
1. The discipline of marketing, at least as practiced in North America, was born during the 1960s at the intersection between the American School of Economics and the American School of Psychology.
Back then, economics was operating under the axiom of the homo economicus (the fully rational economics agent). Some researchers wanted to introduce the affective/emotional component into the model since consumer behaviors are not always purely rational (e.g. compulsive consumption, peer pressure).
For example, consider reading Hinz et al. (2014) on the role of social contagion, peer pressure, and opinion leaders in the adoption of new products among teenagers.
2. For example, Machiavelli (2016, p. 141-142) wrote that “one must be a fox to defend against the snares and a lion to scare off the wolves.” [My translation]
3. In psychology, the self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000) suggests three factors contribute to intrinsic motivation: 1) competence (the self-expectation that the agent will be able to reach his or her goal), 2) autonomy (the perception the decision is undertaken out of one’s free will), and relatedness (a catalyst for the two previous components and can sometimes be absent – the feeling that one has the support of other).
4. Indeed, most HR managers and headhunters do not have the competence to predict the future performance of a programmer. As such, they usually rely on simple cues and heuristics such as the candidate’s degree(s), the programming language (s)he knows, and his or her past work experience when deciding which candidates to interview.
This is one of the reasons why I am no longer a programmer. Since recruiters seek to minimize their personal risks, they usually consider candidates through the lens of what they have accomplished in the past, even though that might be way too easy for them now…
At a certain point, my code portfolio became a liability because I was considered too qualified to be a software developer, yet did not have a bachelor's degree and, consequently, was not considered for software engineering positions. Giftedness sucks…
5. Robert Axelrod, a professor at the University of Michigan, held a tournament in 1980. The optimal algorithm for the prisoner’s dilemma was to cooperate on the first move and then use tit for tat for the successive rounds.
https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/game-theory/axelrod.html
6. For example, if millennials prefer car renting services such as BlablaCar in France (Barbe and Hussler, 2019) or ZipCar in the U.S. over purchasing a new car as a mark of status (Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012), then car manufacturer must update their business model to the new reality.
7. Last year, Sylvain Drouin and I studied the mutual surveillance system enforced by Airbnb as part of our consumer behavior course (MKG8403).
8. That is not to argue, though, that this epistemic stance is always optimal. While it makes sense for those studying in fields such as political science and law to be slightly Machiavellian, it would be worrisome if those studying social work, nursing, and teaching were not moderately and negatively correlated with Machiavellianism (Gruda et al., 2023).
9. Naturally, that is not to argue that replication is not important or that there’s no such thing as a replication crisis in social science at the moment.
Bibliography
Academic articles
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Bardhi, F. et Eckhardt, G. M. (2012). Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing. Journal of Consumer Research, 39(4), 881‑898. https://doi.org/10.1086/666376
Barbe, A.-S. et Hussler, C. (2019). “The war of the worlds won’t occur”: Decentralized evaluation systems and orders of worth in market organizations of the sharing economy. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 143, 64‑75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2019.02.011
Belk, R. (2014). You are what you can access: Sharing and collaborative consumption online. Journal of Business Research, 67(8), 1595‑1600. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.10.001
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Egresi, I., Puiu, V., Zotic, V. et Alexandru, D. (2019). ATTRIBUTES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO GUEST SATISFACTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REVIEWS POSTED ON BOOKING.COM AND ON AIRBNB’S PLATFORM. Acta Geobalcanica, 6(1), 7‑17. https://doi.org/10.18509/AGB.2020.01
Gössling, S., Larson, M. et Pumputis, A. (2021). Mutual surveillance on Airbnb. Annals of Tourism Research, 91, 103314. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2021.103314
Gruda, D., McCleskey, J. et Khoury, I. (2023). Cause we are living in a Machiavellian world, and I am a Machiavellian major: Machiavellianism and academic major choice. Personality and Individual Differences, 205, 112096. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2023.112096
Hall, C. M., Prayag, G., Safonov, A., Coles, T., Gössling, S. et Naderi Koupaei, S. (2022). Airbnb and the sharing economy. Current Issues in Tourism, 25(19), 3057‑3067. https://doi.org/10.1080/13683500.2022.2122418
Hinz, O., Schulze, C. et Takac, C. (2014). New product adoption in social networks: Why direction matters. Journal of Business Research, 67(1), 2836‑2844. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.07.005
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Ketokivi, M. et Mahoney, J. T. (2017). Transaction Cost Economics as a Theory of the Firm, Management, and Governance. Dans M. Ketokivi et J. T. Mahoney, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Business and Management. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190224851.013.6
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Moriuchi, E. (2023). Encouraging Respect?: Understanding consumers’ perspective on the two-way evaluation system in a sharing economy. Journal of Business Research, 163, 113904. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.113904
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Schmitt, B. (1999). Experiential Marketing. Journal of Marketing Management, 15(1‑3), 53‑67. https://doi.org/10.1362/026725799784870496
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Vieira, K. C., Pinto, G. A., Sugano, J. Y., Carvalho, E. G. et Grutzmann, A. A. (2021). Does Network Effect Have an Influence on the Acceptance of Airbnb? Global Business Review, 097215092098865. https://doi.org/10.1177/0972150920988654
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Williamson, O. E. (1991). Strategizing, economizing, and economic organization. Strategic Management Journal, 12(S2), 75‑94. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250121007
Williamson, O. E. (2000). The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 595‑613. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.38.3.595
Williamson, O. E. (2007). Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691869
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Books (English)
Fisher, R., Ury, W. et Patton, B. (2011). Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without giving in (3rd ed., rev. ed). Penguin.
Ury, W. (1992). Getting past no: negotiating with difficult people (New ed). Century Business [u.a.].
Books (French)
Acemoglu, D., Laibson, D. I. et List, J. A. (2016). Microéconomie. Pearson.
Allaire, Y. et Firsirotu, M. E. (2004). Stratégies et moteurs de performance: les défis et les rouages du leaderships stratégique (2e éd). Chenelière/McGraw-Hill.
Johnson, G., Scholes, K., Wittington, R. et Fréry, F. (2008). Stratégique (8e éd). Pearson education.
Machiavelli, N. (2016). Le prince ( Y. Lévy, trad.). Flammarion.
Image
Oliver Williamson. (2024, March 19). In Wikipedia. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Williamson
Professional articles
Murray, W. (2018). Thucydides: Theorist of War. Naval War College Review, 66(4). https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss4/5
Porter, M. E. (2008, 1ᵉʳ janvier). The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2008/01/the-five-competitive-forces-that-shape-strategy
Prahalad, C. K. et Hamel, G. (1990, 1ᵉʳ mai). The Core Competence of the Corporation. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/1990/05/the-core-competence-of-the-corporation